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ARGUMENT
THE COURT ERRED BY SUMMMARILY DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
A.

Introduction

Appellant files this reply brief to address a few points regarding two issues
and otherwise stands on his opening brief. Those issues concern the Bruton1
and/or joinder issue and the Brady2 claim.

B.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Regarding Joinder

First, Appellant responds to a complaint of the state concerning the failure
to object to the pre-trial joinder. The state argues for the first time on appeal that
Appellant “has not attempted to argue how, or if, his trial counsel should have
anticipated the presentation of this particular evidence [statements and evidence
presented at the subsequent trial] at the time of the state’s pretrial joinder
motion.” Respondent’s brief, p. 11-12.
Essentially the state is complaining that Appellant has not established who
knew what when in regards to his attorney learning of the incriminating
statements in relation to the trial. However, the state has waived this argument
since it did not raise it below, presumably because the prosecutor was aware of
when these statements were produced in discovery. Had the state raised it

1

Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620 (1970).

2

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963).

1

below, Petitioner/Appellant could have established exactly when counsel would
have learned about the statements and thus that he or she should have objected
to the joinder or moved to sever.
Second, the state, just like the district court and some other courts cited by
the state, misunderstands the interplay, or really lack of interplay, between
Crawford3 and Bruton.
To understand the point of Bruton and why it is unaffected by Crawford,
the procedure in use at the time must be considered. In Bruton, two defendants
were tried together, and the confession of one of them was admitted against him,
but was inadmissible hearsay as to the other defendant. Accordingly, a limiting
instruction was given that the confession was not to be used in determining the
guilt or innocence of the other defendant.

Bruton’s point was that a limiting

instruction will not always be enough to protect the Sixth Amendment rights of a
declarant’s co-defendants. The Supreme Court concluded that where a nontestifying defendant's extrajudicial statement is "powerfully incriminating" against
other defendants--the statement may not be used in a joint trial at all. Id. at 13536. In such a case, "the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is
so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the
practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored." Id. at 135.
. . . in the context of a joint trial we cannot accept limiting
instructions as an adequate substitute for petitioner's constitutional
right of cross-examination. The effect is the same as if there had
been no instruction.
3

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).

2

Bruton, at p. 137.
Crawford and then Davis4, on the other hand, each involved a single
defendant and a hearsay statement made by a non-defendant witness. The
issues in those cases respectively involved whether a testimonial statement was
procedurally reliable, to wit, subject to cross-examination, and then, whether a
statement was a substitute for testimony or not.
In

short,

there

are

two

lines

of

Confrontation

Clause

cases.

Crawford/Davis dealt with constitutional reliability (i.e., cross-examination) of
evidence admissible against the defendant, whereas Bruton dealt with the
prejudice from evidence inadmissible against the defendant.
Under Crawford/Davis, a non-testimonial hearsay statement which is
admissible against the defendant himself is not barred by the Confrontation
Clause.

However, under Bruton, any “powerfully incriminating” hearsay

statement of a co-defendant that is inadmissible against the defendant under the
rules of evidence also cannot be admitted at the joint trial due to the
Confrontation Clause (unless redacted which is not a possibility here).
Finally, as to the interplay between Bruton and Crawford/Davis, an
important point is those cases had different concerns regarding the Confrontation
Clause because they dealt with different kinds of trials due to the different
numbers of defendants on trial. Crawford/Davis addressed whether admitting

4

Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).

3

certain evidence against the defendant violates the defendant's right of
confrontation. Bruton and its progeny address a different concern--the prejudicial
effect of the unconfronted evidence heard by a jury in a joint trial.
So while both Bruton and Crawford address Confrontation Clause issues,
in a joint defendant case it is Bruton that provides the governing standard.
The distinction between the lines of Confrontation Clause cases is easy to
overlook, and it is unsurprising that some courts have gotten it wrong and believe
that Crawford has overruled or otherwise changed Bruton. But it is now some 14
years after Crawford was decided in 2004 and the United States Supreme Court,
has still never held that it overruled Bruton. 5
What is easy to consider, and the key to our issue, is the question of how
would Paris’ statements be admissible at trial? Again, they are “Vance, you’re
going to prison” and you need to get rid of/burn those clothes because they are
evidence (because of the blood on them).6
The state never addresses the initial admissibly of the statements except
in a footnote. However, while Crawford might not keep Paris’ statements from
being admitted against her, neither does it provide a basis for admitting them as
the state seems to suggest.

Even if this Court were to now hold that Crawford/Davis overruled or otherwise
changed Bruton, that was not clearly established law in 2009 when this trial
occurred, and which is the period of time referenced for an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim. State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 481, 348 P.3d 1, 96 (2015).
5

The state oddly asserts without explanation that these statements do not
implicate or prejudice Vance. But they directly and powerfully implicate him in a
case where his defense was he didn’t do it.
6

4

The district court had two theories of why Paris’ statements were
admissible. Both are wrong. First, the district court claimed Paris’ statements
“were excited utterances” and second, the district court claimed that the “burn the
clothes” statement was a statement against interest of Frankie Hughes, the
witness who testified about it. In its brief the state does not even acknowledge
the latter basis which is obviously wrong on its face and so the state concedes
the error.
Significantly, the state does not seriously argue that the statements were
excited utterances either. It merely adopts the district court’s analysis without
further comment and does not even try to respond to Appellant’s arguments
about why statements from an unexcited witness are not excited utterances.
The proper way that Paris’ statements are admissible that is never
mentioned by the state or district court, presumably because it does not advance
their cause, is as an admission of a party opponent under I.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A).
However, they are only admissible against Paris as the party, not against Vance.
This is why Bruton still applies, and the cases should have been severed.
Actually, our problem is worse than that of Bruton where at least a limiting
instruction was given (even though insufficient). In our case, the statements
were inadmissible against Vance, but came in without limitation despite no
evidentiary basis under the Idaho Rules of Evidence and no opportunity to crossexamine the declarant.

5

C.

Brady Violation-fingerprint report

First, the state argues that the Brady claim is forfeited because it could
have been, but was not, raised on direct appeal. This is simply wrong.
The reason the Brady issue could not have been raised on direct appeal is
because the fingerprint report was not in the appellate record. The reason the
fingerprint report was not in the appellate record was not because of some failing
of Appellant, but because it was not part of the district court record. As shown
even by the state’s explanation of the proceedings in its brief, the prosecution,
acknowledging its late disclosure, “would not attempt to introduce the report as
evidence at trial.” Respondent’s brief, p. 43.
Thus, the fingerprint report was not an offered but rejected exhibit that
becomes part of the record. Nor was it otherwise made part of the district court
record. If anyone had a reason to make the report an exhibit it would be the
prosecution to preserve the issue of the court’s exclusion of the report, but it did
not do so.
In this case, defense counsel certainly would not have placed the report
into the record because as explained regarding the ineffective assistance of
counsel component of this claim, trial counsel did not recognize the exculpatory
nature of the report. Since retained counsel thought the report was bad for
Vance she would have no reason to want it in the record. Nor would appellate
counsel in the direct appeal, assuming arguendo that he for some reason
realized the exculpatory nature of the fingerprint report that was not in the record,

6

have any way to augment the appellate record with it since it was not part of the
district court record.
In short, an issue that is unsupported both in the criminal case district
court record and the direct appeal appellate court record is properly brought in a
petition for post-conviction relief.7
Second, the state does not seriously argue that delayed disclosure cannot
constitute a Brady violation. It argues only that there is no evidence that the
report could have been produced sooner. However, that is not the test for any
Brady violation, which can be inadvertent and does not require bad faith. Rather,
for a late disclosure, a logical test to use is whether the defense received the
report too late to effectively utilize it. The state does not dispute this was the
case, presumably because that is what the district court found when it excluded
the report.
Next as to the Brady issue, the state takes issue for the first time on
appeal about what bottles were used in the attack versus the ones fingerprinted.
What the state is doing without admitting it is controverting the district court’s
factual findings: The district court found:

As an aside, Brady claims by their very nature are more suited to postconvictions proceeding since they would generally require factual development.
In this they are similar to ineffective assistance of counsel claims that are brought
in post-convictions even if they theoretically could be brought on direct appeal.
State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374 (Ct.App. 1993). Thus, even if the fingerprint
report was in the record of the direct appeal (or could have been), Appellant
suggests that the same practical rule also be followed for Brady claims and allow
them to be brought in post-conviction proceedings.
7

7

The fingerprint report showed that Petitioner’s fingerprints showed
up only on a bottle of tequila and not on the beer and liquor bottles
that were actually used as weapons during the fight.
Order Granting State’s Motion for Summary Disposition and Dismissing Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief, p. 38. (R. p. 387.)
The state has again waived this argument by not raising it below in
response to Petitioner’s allegations when factual development could have
occurred.
Finally, while strictly speaking the failure to provide discovery to Vance
issue is separate from the Brady issue, it does rely on it and so will be discussed
here. The fingerprint report is the perfect example of discovery that Vance was
not given.

Had he been, he would have discovered its exculpatory nature

because he did so later and in any event, the exculpatory nature is apparent from
the face of it. Trial counsel on the other hand suppressed the report without
seeing it since she mistakenly thought it was inculpatory.
Thus, had Vance timely been given the report he would have discovered
its exculpatory nature and prevented his trial counsel from suppressing
exculpatory scientific evidence which excluded him from using particular
weapons and also impeached a main state’s witness.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, for the reasons above stated and in Appellant’s Opening Brief,
Appellant respectfully requests the district court’s order summarily dismissing his

8

petition for post-conviction relief be reversed and remanded to the district court.
DATED this 22nd day of June, 2018.
/s/ Greg S. Silvey
Greg S. Silvey
Attorney for Appellant
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